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Abstract— Network survivability is a capability of a net-
worked system to provide its services despite failures or at-
tacks. Attacks, e.g., due to acts of war, being potentially
damaging events, were basically considered in the historical
definitions of a survivability phenomenon. The meaning of
the term: ”network survivability” evolved in the last decade.
Recently, attacks replayed the important role again. Their na-
ture, however, including intrusions, probes, denials of service,
differs from the old one. Survivability is strongly related to
other fields of study. In particular, quality of service depends
on network survivability. We investigate these dependencies in
scale-free networks. Many networks are scale-free, i.e., their
node degree distribution follows the power law. Nodes of the
highest degrees, called centers, are highly vulnerable to at-
tacks. Elimination of these nodes seriously degrades the over-
all performance of network services. In this paper we propose
a model, which, based on traffic parameters of a demand, like
delay or bit rate, allows to establish the survivable and attack
proof end-to-end connections. The key idea of this model is
that for the significant traffic, it establishes paths, which omit
centers. The important connections become more resistant
to attacks. We show that in the best case, obtained for the
highest class of service, the number of broken connections is
reduced even by factor 3. Example results are compared to
those for the standard distance metrics. Our model is ap-
plicable to many network architectures and many classes of
service.
Keywords— survivable data networks, attacks on networks,
scale-free networks, routing, resource allocation.
1. Introduction
Network survivability is a capability of a networked sys-
tem to provide its services despite failures or attacks. At-
tacks, e.g., due to acts of war, being potentially damaging
events, were basically considered in the historical deﬁni-
tions of a survivability phenomenon. In the last decade,
focus was rather on protecting systems against failures, due
to software defects, hardware faults or human errors. Re-
cently, attacks replayed the important role again. Their
nature, however, including intrusions, probes, denials of
service, diﬀers from the old one.
Survivability is strongly related to other ﬁelds of study,
including fault-tolerance, reliability, safety or performance
evaluation. In particular, quality of service depends on
network survivability. In this paper we investigate these
dependencies in scale-free networks (SFNs). Many net-
works are scale-free, i.e., their node degree distribution fol-
lows the power law. Nodes of the highest degrees, called
centers, are highly vulnerable to attacks. Elimination of
these nodes seriously degrades the overall performance of
network services.
Redundancy is the key to provide services in the face of
attacks or failures. Survivability, based on the experience
of fault tolerance, assumes various techniques of protection
and restoration. Protection in our model is based on the pre-
planned backup path for each active (working) end-to-end
path [7, 10]. Depending on allowable costs, protecting
paths may be either dedicated or shared. This is typical
for all survivable networks. The scale-free networks, how-
ever, need a special treatment.
Centers in such networks are connected to many other
nodes by links of high capacities, switch large amount of
data and are of great degree. They are excellent goals of
malicious attacks, performed by intruders getting the max-
imum destructive eﬀect at minimum cost.
An example of a scale-free network is shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. An example of a scale-free network.
Centers exist in many networks. It has been proved, that
the uncontrolled growth of a network leads to a power law
distribution of node degrees (P(k) ∼ k−γ) [2]. Figure 2
presents the degree distribution P(k) of scale-free networks
compared to random topologies (having the Poisson degree
distribution).
By uncontrolled growth we mean adding the new elements
according to the preferential attachment rule. Following
such a rule, network nodes are mostly being attached to the
already highly connected ones. This phenomenon, often
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referred to as the rich get richer process, causes networks
to become scale-free.
Fig. 2. Comparison of Poisson and power law distributions.
It has been proved that the topology of many wide-area
networks is scale-free [1, 4, 6, 8]. Such topologies can be
also found in other ﬁelds of science, for instance in chem-
istry or biology. Some examples of power law distribution
that are worth mentioning can be found for the stock-price
ﬂuctuations, movie actor collaboration networks, biologi-
cal cellular networks, scientiﬁc citation networks and many
others.
If connections are established with help of the shortest path
algorithm and the standard distance metrics, nodes of ex-
traordinary high degree are often the transit elements of the
installed paths. We deﬁne the parameter named between-
ness centrality with regard to a certain node k, denoted
BC(k) as [5]:
BC(k) = ∑
p 6=q
δk(p,q)
δ (p,q) , (1)
where:
δ (p,q) is the number of shortest paths between nodes p
and q,
δk(p,q) is the number of shortest paths between nodes p
and q that run through a vertex k.
Each central node has a high value of BC, because many
shortest paths established between various pairs of nodes
(p,q) traverse such nodes. Attacks on centers may thus
cause many connections to fail.
In this paper we propose a model, which, based on traﬃc
parameters of a demand, allows to establish the survivable
end-to-end paths in scale-free networks. Speciﬁc properties
of scale-free networks imply the choice of a new metrics
of the cost of a link and new algorithms ﬁnding paths, re-
ducing the number of connections broken due to an attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the model of establishing survivable connections
with regard to the requested level of continuity of service
in scale-free networks. Section 3 presents the integer lin-
ear programming (ILP) formulation of the problem and
the corresponding heuristic algorithm. Modeling results,
obtained for an artiﬁcial scale-free network, are shown in
Section 4 and include: the probability of demand rejection,
length of active path, the number of broken connections
and the values of restoration time.
2. Model description
The main objective of our model is to establish survivable
connections in the way that the number of connections bro-
ken due to an attack on a node is reduced. The decrease
in number of broken connections is to be greater with the
increase of the required level of service. It can be achieved
with help of a metrics that, depending on the requested
class of service, forces active paths to bypass nodes of high
degree.
We consider the network consisting of N nodes and A di-
rected arcs. Nodes and arcs are numbered:
n−1, . . . , N;
a = 1, . . . , A.
We assume K ≤ N(N−1) demands. We denote:
pk(qk) source (destination) of a demand k;
k = 1, 2, . . . , K
ca capacity of an arc a
Λa number of channels of an arc a
∏p,q an active path from pk to qk
∏p,q a backup path from pk to qk
c
[
∏p,q
]
the requested capacity for a connection
from pk to qk
Ca spare capacity on an arc a
M classes of service are assumed, numbered from 0
to M−1. Class 0 represents demands for which the proba-
bility of breaking the connections must be minimized. With
the increase of a class number, the requested level of ser-
vice continuity gets lower. Various types of traﬃc of many
network architectures (e.g., ATM) can be mapped onto the
proposed classes, which makes the approach widely appli-
cable.
In order to ﬁnd active paths on a shortest-path basis, we
propose the metrics that determines the cost κa a of an
arc a, as shown in Eq. (2):
κma =


m
M−1
d∗a +
(M−1)−m
M−1
BC∗(n) if c
[
∏p,q
]
≤Ca
∞ otherwise
,
(2)
where:
m is the current class of service; m = 0,1,2, . . . ,M−1,
d∗a is the normalized length of an arc a:
d∗a =
da
max
a
(da)
. (3)
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BC∗(n) is the normalized value of the betweenness central-
ity of a node n:
BC∗(n) = BC(n)
max
n
(
BC(n)
) . (4)
If there is not enough spare capacity on an arc a to in-
stall the active path (according to the requested capacity
c[∏p,q]), then the cost of using this arc is set to inﬁnity.
Otherwise the cost is the weighted sum of the normalized
length of an arc (d∗a ) and the value of the normalized be-
tweenness centrality coeﬃcient BC∗(n) of the end node n
of an arc a. Two boundary cases are worth explanation:
• Class 0 for demands of the highest quality of ser-
vice. Here the cost of the arc is calculated only on
the basis of the value of BC∗(n). This results in in-
stalling paths that omit central nodes. This causes
the connections of class 0 to have a low probability
of breaking. However, the installed active paths are
not the shortest ones.
• Class M− 1 for connections that do not require the
guarantee of continuity. For them the cost of each
arc is determined by Eq. (2) and is thus equal to:
κM−1a =
{d∗a if c[∏p,q ]≤Ca
∞ otherwise
. (5)
Here, the active paths of connections are the shortest
ones in the sense of distance but often run through
central nodes and are thus exposed to attacks.
For classes 1,2, . . . ,M − 2 characteristics of active paths
with regard to their length and vulnerability to attacks are
expected to be the compromise of the corresponding fea-
tures of classes 0 and M−1, respectively.
Backup paths are found using the standard distance metrics.
In order to allow fast restoration of connections of each
class in case of a failure, the backups are computed as the
shortest ones.
3. Methods used to compute active
and backup paths
In the following part of the paper, the protection against
a single node failure is assumed. All backup paths are
dedicated (not shared). There is only one backup path for
each connection (path protection model).
3.1. The ILP formulation of the problem
We propose using the following nomenclature:
N set of nodes of a network
A set of directed link (arcs) in a network
K number of source-destination (demand) pairs of
nodes, K ≤ N(N−1)
pk source node of a demand k
qk destination node of a demand k
αλk,a takes value of 1 if a channel λ of an arc a is used
by an active path of a demand k; 0 – otherwise
β λk,a takes value of 1 if a channel λ of an arc a is used
by a backup path of a demand k; 0 – otherwise
λa a capacity of an arc a represented by the number of
channels: ∀aλa = Λ
κmk,a the channel cost in an arc a calculated by consider-
ing the class m of a demand k and the length of an
arc according to Eq. (2) (for active paths)
sk,a the channel cost in an arc a calculated for a de-
mand k with regard to its length (for backup paths)
x vector of all components of ﬂows (variables)
It is to ﬁnd paths transporting required ﬂows from sources
to destinations, protecting them against a single node failure
and minimizing the linear cost:
ϕ(x) =
K
∑
k=1
A
∑
a=1
λa∑
λ=1
(
κλk,a ·α
λ
k,a + sk,a ·β λk,a
)
(6)
subject to constraints given in Eqs. (7)–(15).
a) Capacity constraints (on the number of the available
wavelengths on an arc a):
λa∑
λ=1
K
∑
k=1
(
αλk,a +β λk,a
)
≤ λa . (7)
b) The flow balance constraints for each wavelength λ
and for each demand k:
For a source node of an active path:
∑αλk,a
{a:a≡(pk, j); j=1,2,K,N; j 6=pk}
− ∑αλk,a
{a:a≡(i,pk);i=1,2,K,N;i 6=pk}
= 1 .
(8)
For a destination node of an active path:
∑αλk,a
{a:a≡(qk, j); j=1,2,K,N; j 6=qk}
− ∑αλk,a
{a:a≡(i,qk);i=1,2,K,N;i 6=qk}
=−1 .
(9)
For transit nodes of an active path:
∑αλk,a
{a:a≡(i, j); j=1,2,K,N;i,j6=pk,i,j6=qk}
− ∑αλk,a
{a:a≡(i, j);i=1,2,K,N;i, j 6=pk,i,j6=qk}
=0.
(10)
For a source node of a backup path:
∑β λk,a
{a:a≡(pk, j); j=1,2,K,N; j 6=pk}
− ∑β λk,a
{a:a≡(i,pk);i=1,2,K,N;i 6=pk}
= 1 .
(11)
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For a destination node of a backup path:
∑β λk,a
{a:a≡(qk, j); j=1,2,K,N; j 6=qk}
− ∑β λk,a
{a:a≡(i,qk);i=1,2,K,N;i 6=qk}
=−1 .
(12)
For transit nodes of a backup path:
∑β λk,a
{a:a≡(i, j); j=1,2,K,N;i, j6=pk, i, j6=qk}
− ∑β λk,a
{a:a≡(i, j);i=1,2,K,N;i, j6=pk,i, j6=qk}
= 0 .
(13)
c) Constraints assuring nodal-disjointness of active and
backup paths:
λa∑
λ=1
∑
{a:a≡(i, j); j=1,2,K,N; j 6=i;i 6=pk}
(
αλk,a +β λk,a
)
≤ 1 , (14)
λa∑
λ=1
∑
{a:a≡(i, j);i=1,2,K,N;i 6= j; j 6=qk}
(
αλk,a +β λk,a
)
≤ 1 . (15)
Constraint, given in Eq. (7), assures that the total number of
channels, reserved for survivable connections on an arc a,
will not exceed the capacity of this arc. For each channel
and each demand, ﬂow balance for the active paths is as-
sured by Eqs. (8)–(10). For instance, Eq. (8) guarantees
that there is only one active path outgoing from the source
node sk. Equation (10) simply states that transit nodes do
not store traﬃc. Equations (11)–(13) describe the ﬂow bal-
ance constraints for backup paths, respectively.
3.2. The SACC heuristic algorithm
SACC algorithm of establishing survivable and attack-com-
pliant connections
Input:
• A pair of source and destination nodes [pk, qk]
• Requested capacity c [∏p,q]
• Requested class of service m
• Number of classes of service M
1. Find the active path of a connection:
1.1. For each arc a calculate its cost as deﬁned in
Eq. (2)
1.2. Find the shortest path between nodes pk and qk,
using the matrix of costs C, evaluated in 1.1
1.3. If the active path is found then install it, else
go to Step 3
2. Find the backup path:
2.1. For each arc a evaluate its cost as deﬁned in
Eq. (5)
2.2. In order to assure the nodal disjointness of ac-
tive and backup paths of a connection, set the
costs of active path’s arcs as well as arcs inci-
dent to active path’s nodes to inﬁnity
2.3. Find the shortest path between nodes pk and qk,
using the matrix of costs C, evaluated in 2.1
2.4. If the backup path is found then install the path
3. If any of the two paths cannot be found due to the
lack of spare resources, then reject the demand and
remove the active path (if installed), else establish
the connection
The main advantage of using heuristic methods over ILP
approach is their polynomial complexity. SACC algorithm,
described below, uses a Dijkstra’s algorithm to ﬁnd a short-
est path between a pair of a source and destination nodes.
4. Modeling results
In this section we focus our research on measuring the
probability of demand rejection, the average length of ac-
tive path, the number of broken connections and restoration
times for various classes of service. The scale-free network,
shown in Fig. 3, used in research, was generated by Pajek
software.
Fig. 3. The SFN artiﬁcial scale-free network.
According to the values of the normalized betweenness cen-
trality parameter, given in Table 1, nodes: 1, 6, 8, 14 having
high values of BC∗ can be referred to as centers.
Table 1
Values of the normalized betweenness centrality
for nodes of the SFN network
Node k 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
BC∗(k) 0.063 0.367 0.023 0.077 0.046 0.135 1.000
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
0.085 0.462 0.081 0.035 0.058 0.213 0.027 0.300
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All the paths for survivable connections were obtained with
help of AMPL/CPLEX environment as well as with dedi-
cated network simulator, implemented in C++ environment.
Due to the complexity of the optimal algorithm (NP com-
pleteness of the investigated ILP formulation) calculation
of paths was infeasible for real large networks. Simulation
focused on measuring the number of broken connections
and restoration times was then run with the use of our ded-
icated network simulator.
The following properties were assumed for all the directed
links of the network:
– equal number of available channels (here 8);
– equal capacity of all channels;
– equal length (1890 km).
For each connection we assumed:
– class of service chosen randomly out of M available
classes;
– metrics given in Eq. (2) in all active path computa-
tions;
– standard distance metrics, given in Eq. (5), in all
backup path computations;
– a demand of resource allocation equal to the capacity
of one channel of a link;
– protection against a single node failure.
Connections were broken due to attacks on nodes (one each
time). The probability of each node to be attacked was as-
sumed to be proportional to the values of BC∗(k). During
each experiment for the SFN network, 30 logical topologies
were generated. Each logical topology is a graph of a ﬁxed
(here 10) number of randomly chosen pairs of source and
destination nodes. For each logical topology, failures of
100 nodes were generated to measure the numbers of bro-
ken connection and values of restoration time.
4.1. The ILP results
Table 2 shows results of path computation obtained by
solving the optimization problem stated in Subsection 3.1
with help of AMPL/CPLEX environment.
It was to ﬁnd paths for connections of 3 classes of service
available. The results prove that smaller the class number
was (meaning higher requested level of service continu-
ity), more active paths omitted nodes of high degree. For
instance a connection between nodes 1 and 14 of the high-
est (0) class of service, was realized by establishing a long
(but omitting centers; here 6, 8) active path: (1, 5, 7, 11,
13, 14) and a much shorter backup path (1, 6, 14). On the
contrary, a connection of the lowest class (here 2), between
nodes 0 and 4, was realized by a short active path (0, 4)
and a much longer backup path (0, 1, 6, 12, 4).
Table 2
Example paths for 10 survivable connections of 3 classes
of service (0, 1 and 2), established according
to the proposed model
Connection: (0,4) priority: 2
Active path: 0 4
Backup path: 0 1 6 12 4
Connection: (0,11) priority: 1
Active path: 0 1 5 7 11
Backup path: 0 4 12 6 8 11
Connection: (1,12) priority: 1
Active path: 1 6 12
Backup path: 1 0 4 12
Connection: (1,14) priority: 0
Active path: 1 5 7 11 13 14
Backup path: 1 6 14
Connection: (2,7) priority: 1
Active path: 2 1 5 7
Backup path: 2 3 6 8 7
Connection: (2,11) priority: 0
Active path: 2 1 5 7 11
Backup path: 2 3 6 8 11
Connection: (5,11) priority: 1
Active path: 5 7 11
Backup path: 5 6 8 11
Connection: (5,13) priority: 2
Active path: 5 7 11 13
Backup path: 5 6 14 13
Connection: (6,8) priority: 2
Active path: 6 8
Backup path: 6 14 8
Connection: (0,14) priority: 2
Active path: 9 6 14
Backup path: 9 10 8 14
4.2. Probability of demand rejection
We considered the phenomenon of demand rejection due
to all possible reasons. The main causes included:
– lack of available link channels;
– topology bottlenecks.
Figure 4 shows the probability of demand rejection for
3 classes of service, while Fig. 5 – for 6 classes of ser-
vice, respectively.
Comparing results for M classes of service, we see that
CPLEX served all the demands. This is due to the fact that
only 10 demands were deﬁned for each logical topology
and there was enough resources to serve all of them. In
contrast, our heuristic algorithm found local optima and,
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Fig. 4. Probability of demand rejection for 3 classes of service.
Fig. 5. Probability of demand rejection for 6 classes of service.
due to bottlenecks, some of the demands were rejected.
There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the total number of
rejected demands between 3 and 6 classes of service.
4.3. Number of active path links
Figures 6 and 7, and Table 3 show the numbers of active
path links as the function of the connection class of service.
When increasing the level of the requested continuity of
service of a connection (decreasing the class number), its
active path becomes longer. This is because it omits nodes
Fig. 6. Average number of active path links for 3 classes of
service.
of high degree. In the worst case for 3 classes of service,
the average length of active path obtained for the class 0,
was about 1.31 times worse than for the class 2.
Fig. 7. Average number of active path links for 6 classes of
service.
Table 3
Average number of active path links for 3 and 6 classes
of service (CPLEX)
Number of service classes 3
Class number 0 1 2
Active path length (CPLEX) 2.84 2.23 2.16
[links] (heuristics) 2.84 2.15 1.98
95% conﬁdence (CPLEX) 0.48 0.27 0.27
interval [links] (heuristics) 0.49 0.26 0.26
Number of service classes 6
Class number 0 1 2 3 4 5
Active path length (CPLEX) 2.79 2.32 2.33 2.22 2.12 2.19
[links] (heuristics) 2.77 2.32 2.30 2.20 2.06 2.09
95% conﬁdence (CPLEX) 0.69 0.50 0.46 0.38 0.37 0.33
interval [links] (heuristics) 0.67 0.51 0.46 0.39 0.38 0.33
Typically, heuristic algorithms give worse results than the
respective ILP ones. Generally, this remains true for our
SACC algorithm. However, due to the non-zero proba-
bility of rejecting the demands for the SACC algorithm
(Figs. 4 and 5), the obtained active paths turned out to
be shorter than the respective ILP ones. This was due to
the smaller network congestion, obtained when SACC algo-
rithm was used, as it established less connections than the
ILP algorithm. This feature caused similar eﬀect regarding
the aggregate number of broken connections and the total
restoration time, described in the next subsections.
4.4. Number of broken connections
Figures 8 and 9 show the aggregate numbers of broken con-
nections as the function of the connection class of service.
They prove that the proposed model results in a signiﬁcant
decrease in the number of broken connections. The higher
the requested level of service continuity is, the decrease
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in the number of broken connections gets more visible.
In the best case, observed for 6 classes of service, about
67% less connections were broken for the class 0, compared
to the results for the class 5.
Fig. 8. Aggregate number of broken connections for 3 classes of
service.
Fig. 9. Aggregate number of broken connections for 6 classes of
service.
4.5. Restoration time
Figures 10 and 11 show the values of the average restoration
time as the function of the connection class of service.
They represent the time needed to restore a connection after
Fig. 10. Average restoration time [ms] for 3 classes of service.
Fig. 11. Average restoration time [ms] for 6 classes of service.
a failure of a node, according to the protocol described
in [11]. They prove that for the SFN network the value
of restoration time does not depend much on the service
class. This dependency is, however, very remarkable when
analyzing the aggregate value of restoration time. Such an
aggregate value for a given class k is calculated as the sum
of all restoration times for connections of class k during
one experiment.
Fig. 12. Aggregate restoration time [ms] for 3 classes of service.
Fig. 13. Aggregate restoration time [ms] for 6 classes of service.
Figures 12 and 13 prove that the proposed model leads to
a signiﬁcant reduction in the value of the aggregate restora-
tion time. The higher the requested level of service con-
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tinuity is, the aggregate value of restoration time is more
reduced (even about 4 times for the class 0, when 6 classes
are used).
5. Conclusions
Results obtained by us conﬁrm that the proposed model
contributes to a signiﬁcant reduction in the number of bro-
ken connections for classes of high priority. The active
paths of such connections omit central nodes and are thus
more resistant to attacks. On the other hand, low prior-
ity connections are often exposed to attacks. They are,
however, realized by the shortest active paths (in the sense
of distance), providing shorter values of data transmission
delay.
Concluding the paper, we point out that in a scale-free net-
work, one cannot have connections that are simultaneously
resistant-to-attack and are realized by short active paths.
A short active path of a connection means that with high
probability it goes through central nodes and thus is at high
risk of breaking.
However, we claim that establishing attack-resistant connec-
tions, realized by short active paths could be possible for
networks of a regular topology. For the scale-free network
it would be the best to make it more regular. Topology
improvements are, however, beyond the scope of this paper
and constitute the subject for future research.
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